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Cognitive dimensions of public space
Maciej Błaszak
Abstract: The paper presents a new approach to cognitive aspects 
of public space based on the Bayesian framework for cognition. 
According to it, cognition is powered by hypothesis-testing brain, 
constantly minimizing its prediction error. Expectations the brain 
generates can be analyzed at three different levels of organization: 
(1) neural implementation, comprising of three distinctive corti-
cal networks, (2) mental computation, consisting of three parts 
of the Bayes’ rule, and (3) social behavior inside three different 
social networks. Properly designed the public space can be part 
of the extended mind of its inhabitants, enhancing or substitut-
ing their brains’ activity.
Keywords: Bayesian brain, predictive mind, salience network, central 
executive network, default mode network, extended mind
We tend to assume that other people perceive the world as 
we do. This false-consensus effect (Ross, Greene & House, 
1977) is responsible – among others – for interpreting the 
human mind as hardwired into the human brain. Accord-
ing to this view, cognition can be safely understood without 
considering the context in which it occurs. Mental states are 
postulated to be distinct, recognizable phenomena, shared 
with most our fellow humans due to our common evolu-
tionary heritage. We express them rather quickly on our 
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faces and through our body posture, when dedicated clus-
ters of neurons leap into action and cause the body to act 
in a specific way.
At the heart of this traditional view of the human mind 
lies the theory of reactive perception, progressively accu-
mulating elementary two-dimensional sensory features 
and bounding them together into complex three-dimension-
al perceptual shapes. The way people saw in the past can 
be compared to how we see today, because physically and 
psychologically they were very much like us, cumulatively 
processing bottom-up sensory features, yielding perceptu-
al categories which activate stored conceptual knowledge. 
This classical sandwich model of the mind (Hurley, 2001) 
assumes linear one-directional flow of information from sen-
sory input to behavioral output, with cognition sandwiched 
between them, passively waiting for environmental stimuli. 
In this view the world isn’t encountered as a locus of mean-
ing, expected to be in the most probable shape by the pre-
dictive brain (Clark, 2016).
However, perception isn’t reactive but proactive, pow-
ered by hypothesis-testing brain, constantly minimizing its 
prediction error (Hohwy, 2013). This marvelous organ diag-
noses the world on the basis of stimulations of the senses. 
In case of vision, it tries to find out what in our surround-
ings is responsible for this particular retinal image. Mak-
ing an intelligent guess isn’t easy, because there is too little 
sensory information available to the perceiver. The brain is 
forced to deliver the extra knowledge replacing the missing 
retinal information and recovering the 3D world from a 2D 
image. The extra knowledge becomes apparent as visual 
data is degraded (e.g. Charles Bonnet syndrome affecting 
people who are going blind), or ambiguous scenes are pre-
sented (e.g. face-vase illusion) (Stone, 2012).
The knowledge necessary to perform reliable inference 
from 2D image to 3D world takes the form of inborn biases 
or acquired beliefs. Both cannot be obtained from the reti-
nal image. They are priors making it possible for the human 
brain to see (Frisby & Stone, 2010), even when there is too 
little available information to be seen. In terms of neural 
connections, 10 percent of visual information comes from the 
eyes, and the rest are the priors coming from brain networks 
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(Lotto, 2017) and making sense of all retinal images. This 
lack of balance between bottom-up input and top-down pri-
ors lets neuroscientists call perception “controlled halluci-
nation” (Clark, 2016, p. 14).
Retinal images and different priors are ingredients of the 
Bayesian framework for vision. It allows to explain how 
incoming sensory information can be combined with existing 
neural information to produce knowledge about the world. 
Of course inference about the world draws on many different 
priors which point to many possible causes of this particular 
retinal image. The problem of vision is how the right prior – 
in the form of hypothesis – is selected. Selection is inferen-
tial and demands three basic parameters: (1) sensory input 
(p(i)), (2) possible hypotheses (p(h)), and (3) likelihood of the 
hypotheses, i.e. how likely it is that a given hypothesis fits 
the sensory input (p(i|h)). Bayes’ rule lets the brain update 
the probability of the hypothesis, given the sensory input, 
the prior probability of this hypothesis, and its likelihood: 
Fig. 1 Bayes’ rule
p(h|i) = p(i|h)p(h)/p(i)
Interpreting sensory input in the context of previous 
knowledge can be illustrated with an example of a musi-
cian doing a part time job in a music store. Suppose the ret-
ina of his eye registers 2D image of a piano. His brain knows 
that this image is consistent with many possible objects 
in the world: the piano itself, the maquette of the piano, the 
photo of the piano, the mirror image of the piano, etc. The 
brain’s task is to figure out the most probable causes of the 
sensory data using a vast repertoire of its prior beliefs. 
Suppose that the probability of this given sensory input – 
i.e. the retinal image of a piano – in the space of a music 
store is 0,081 (p(i) = 0,081). Then likelihoods of two hypoth-
eses: 80% of pianos give these sensory symptoms (p(i|pia-
no) = 0,8), and – let’s assume – 90% of mirror images of the 
piano give the same symptoms (p(i|mirror image of the pia-
no) = 0,9). And last but not the least, everyone knows that 
pianos are common in the music store, whereas their mir-
ror images are rare: p(piano) = 0,1 vs. p(mirror image of the 
piano) = 0,001. The musician can use his prior knowledge 
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to decide which situation in the world – the piano or its mir-
ror image – caused the sensory image in his eye. Arriving at 
a conclusion requires considering the product of the likeli-
hood and the prior probability of the hypothesis divided by 
the probability of sensory input.
Fig. 2 Bayes’ rule for both hypotheses discussed above
p(piano|i) = p(i|piano)p(piano)/p(i) = 0,8 x 0,1 / 0,081 = 0,988
p(mirror image of the piano|i) =  
= p(i|mirror image of the piano)p(mirror image of the piano)/p(i) = 
= 0,9 x 0,001 / 0,081 = 0,011
The results prove why we shouldn’t take the input alone 
to decide which situation in the world is responsible for the 
retinal image. The equations must take account of the previ-
ous knowledge of the relative prevalence of pianos (p = 0,1) 
and mirror images of the pianos (p = 0,001) in music stores. 
The Bayes’ rule combines prior knowledge with sensory data 
to interpret these data, showing that the predictive brain is 
a well-adapted inference engine. 
Creating a visual percept in the form of hypothesis 
“what’s out there” (Gregory, 2009), required extra informa-
tion in the form of biases or prior beliefs. Bayesian updat-
ing of beliefs is the result of cumulative neuronal selection 
creating epistemic complexities that make up our conscious 
minds. The humanistic concepts and philosophical purpos-
es – we often think with and about – emerge from repeat-
ed selection of best hypotheses tested against sensory data. 
Our mental objects we care about most – concepts, scripts, 
schemas, hypotheses, theories – must have complicated his-
tories during which information is discarded and complexity 
is created. Meaning of the conscious percepts (Norretrand-
ers, 1998) doesn’t arise from the information in the mental 
states, but from the information discarded (Bennett, 1990) 
during the process of computational selection. In result, the 
conscious content makes sense in some context, creating 
behavior we perceive as purposeful.
It’s clear that to understand the human mind and its 
creations that build our public space we must explain the 
origin of complex mental states at the level of neuronal 
implementation. Their purpose-like character is measured 
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by complexity of the algorithms that executed them, using 
the network-like structure of the brain’s cortex. All complex 
forms of cognition depend on interconnected networks, inte-
grating both cross-modal information and sensory stimula-
tion with prior knowledge.
Three basic neural networks (Koutstaal & Binks, 2015) 
are evolutionarily devoted to formation of ideas connected 
with homeostatic security, analytic problem solving and cre-
ative reflection. They are organized in “a cascade of layers 
in which the higher layers make Bayesian predictions about 
what the next layer down in the system will “see” next” (Den-
nett, 2017). Many-layered expectations the brain generates 
are at three distinct levels of computations: (1) sensations 
are guesses about what the brain is going to receive from the 
physical world, (2) perceptions are guesses about the cogni-
tive niche, and (3) conceptions are guesses about the axiologi-
cal mind. If prediction error is small (i.e. the place is perfectly 
matched with brain’s expectations), the surrounding can be 
treated as a part of the extended human mind.
The first network – called “the salience network” (Uddin, 
2017) – is integrating external and internal information 
that is significant (i.e. salient) for us. Its action is connect-
ed with principle of optimal energy utilization, specifically 
by the human brain, which is – relative to its weight – the 
most expensive organ of the body. Maintaining the health 
requires sensory representations of the body condition in the 
form of distinct feelings based on interoceptive integration 
in insular cortex of the brain (Craig, 2015). At the level 
of the sentient self, responsible for attaining optimal energy 
efficiency, our behavior is guided by emotional motivations, 
allowing Arthur (Bud) Craig to phrase “I feel, therefore 
I am” (Craig, 2015, p. XVII).
Thanks to interoception, any sensation coming from the 
body is transformed to a feeling in the area of insular cor-
tex. Bodily awareness is generated in its posterior part (“I’m 
cold”, “it hurts”), and social awareness in its anterior part 
(“I’m happy”, “I’m safe”). When anterior insula signals high 
level of safety, the information moves to anterior cingulate 
cortex, responsible – among the others – for human motiva-
tion. A motivated man is a safe man, especially in a social 
domain, connected with his or her family.
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What’s important, feelings from the body are accompa-
nied by autonomic reflexes, either in sympathetic division 
(stress on) or parasympathetic division (stress off). Emo-
tional feelings are generated by bodily actions caused by 
autonomic reaction: we are scary because we started flee-
ing, not the other way round. The anatomical and function-
al organization of the salience network gives credit to the 
James-Lange theory of emotion, underlining the fact that 
autonomic activation precedes awareness of feelings.
The salience network – assuming it’s safe all around – 
can switch between two other networks, the central exec-
utive network and the default mode network (Bressler & 
Menon, 2010). The first is responsible for externally driven 
effortful mental activity, and its key brain regions are the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (holding goals and executing 
working memory), anterior cingulated cortex, already met 
as a part of the salience network (error monitoring and eval-
uating progress) and posterior parietal cortex (attentional 
control and attentional switching) (Koutstaal & Binks, 2015, 
p. 126). The working memory of the executive brain (Gold-
berg, 2010) holds up to 120 bits of information per second, 
being the bottleneck of the brain. In consequence, this part 
of the cortex can easily be information overloaded (Levitin, 
2015), leading to Attention Deficit Trait (ADT) (Hallowell, 
2005). Our susceptibility to distracting high-tech world (Gaz-
zaley & Rosen, 2016) – acting as a collection of supernormal 
stimuli – results mainly from the mismatch between our 
ancient bodies and our fast changing world (Gluckman & 
Hanson, 2006). The crisis of attention makes our lives more 
fragmented and ourselves less coherent (Crawford, 2015).
The salience network collects sensory stimuli (p(i)) and 
builds the sentient self (“I feel therefore I am”). The cen-
tral executive network tests hypotheses, evaluating their 
likelihoods (p(i|h)) and builds the epistemic self (“I think 
therefore I am”). The third cortical network, the default 
mode network (Raichle & Snyder, 2007) generates hypoth-
eses during leisure time (p(h)) and builds the reflective self 
(“I imagine therefore I am”). The last cortical network gets 
automatically activated when the mind starts wandering 
and we stop paying attention to the tasks at hand (Corbal-
lis, 2015). It comprises ventromedial and medial prefrontal 
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cortex (self-related and emotional information), the poste-
rior cingulate cortex (mental imagery and autobiographical 
memory) and posterior parietal cortex (attentional control 
and attentional switching). The default mode network car-
ries out mindreading, creative thinking, mental time travel 
and axiological evaluation of one’s and other people’s deeds. 
Its activity – always “on” when we are wandering, and “off” 
during task execution – is necessary for building the con-
ceptual self. The Oracle at Delphi urging all to “know thy-
self” and Socrates exhorting people that “the unexamined 
life is not worth living” (Plato’s Apology, 38a5-6) both unin-
tentionally refer to the default mode network activity (Lie-
berman, 2013, p. 184).
Fig. 3 Cortical networks in the human brain – simplified schema
The predictive mind and its neuronal implementation – 
the Bayesian brain – occupy two of three levels of under-
standing of the human information processing system. David 
Marr, the maverick British mathematician, computer scien-
tist and one of the founders of cognitive science, called these 
two levels, respectively, the algorithm level (the mind) and 
the hardware level (the brain) (Marr, 1982). The third level, 
“computational”, describes the behavior of the system which 
processes information at the level of the mind and physically 
implements it at the level of the brain. This third computa-
tional level incorporates cognitive dimensions of the public 
space, being part of the extended human mind. 
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The public space is definitely an example of a complex sys-
tem, composed of myriad agents whose collective characteris-
tics aren’t easily predicted from the properties of individual 
components themselves (West, 2017). They are continuous-
ly interacting with the rest of the system, which lacks any 
central control. The system as a whole exhibits emergent, 
self-organized behavior, easily adaptable to changing exter-
nal conditions. That’s why it’s often called “complex adaptive 
system” (Miller & Page, 2007) evolving and increasing its – 
whatsoever measured – fitness. Although the public space 
can be thought of in terms of its physicality – urban places 
or natural scenes – it is first of all a social community behav-
ing remarkably similar all over the world. The integration 
and interplay of both physical and social networks give rise 
to cognitive phenomena of extended minds, whose boundar-
ies encompass individual brains, bodies and designed arti-
facts. Extending boundaries of the mind beyond boundaries 
of the brain increases individual creativity and intelligence, 
social innovation and economic output.
Of course the size of public space is changeable, depend-
ing on social networks density, connectivity and transitivity 
(Massey, 2005). From the outset of our life, when attachment 
rules our emotional development, we live in intimate net-
works ranged in size from three to seven people (Milardo, 
1992). What counts then is an intense exchange of emotion-
al resources during face-to-face interactions. They create the 
first cognitive dimension of public space that can be called 
“experiential dimension” after the classical Steen Rasmus-
sen’s book on architecture (Rasmussen, 1962). Experiencing 
is analyzed at the level of mental sensations, implemented by 
the salience network, whose key part – anterior cingulate cor-
tex – registers both physical and social pain. Social stigmati-
zation hurts more than a broken leg, and ostracism is among 
the highest forms of punishment (Lieberman, 2013, p. 56).
Then goes the effective network maintained to deal with 
the logistics of everyday life, when people pursue instru-
mental goals associated with work, leisure time, career and 
accumulation of material and symbolic resources. Emotion-
al exchanges give way to epistemic strategic exchanges, 
mainly in the form of mindreading, carried out both by the 
default mode network and the central executive network. 
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Mindreading ability develops between 2 and 4 years of life, 
and engages mental percepts which refer not to physical 
world (like sensations), but cognitive niche composed of pack-
ets of valuable information. They are called “affordances” and 
defined as what the environment “offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979).
The effective networks range from 6 to 34 people (Milar-
do, 1992) and constitute functional dimension of the pub-
lic space. “Functional” because strategic games played by 
social actors let them treat the others as clever tools, form-
ing a cognitive scaffolding for their own brains. There are 
two ways of forming packets of valuable information: neu-
ronal and behavioral. The first road uses our own neuronal 
machinery which discards and selects sensory informa-
tion (over 11 million bits per second) and creates conscious 
states containing little (120 bits per second) but very valu-
able information. This process is costly and takes time, at 
least 350 milliseconds (Libet, 2005). Our consciousness is 
always little bit off-line, but we don’t recognize this cognitive 
time-lag. The second road is paved for us by others – par-
ents, teachers, bosses – designing affordances which, in the 
form of developing cognitive niche, make each generation 
more intelligent than the previous ones (Flynn, 2016).
Our children are getting smarter not because their brains 
have phylogenetically changed, but because former genera-
tions made a hard epistemic work, helping them to under-
stand the world better and to interpret its phenomena 
in a consistent way. The behavioral road is cheaper and 
explains why the basic form of learning is an imitation. As 
Caliban says in the second scene of Shakespeare’s The Tem-
pest: “Remember, first to possess his books; for without them 
he’s but a sot, as I am”. Cognitive artifacts can make a differ-
ence, other people minds can change our worldview, not nec-
essarily our own brain’s activity. The evolutionary process 
of niche construction is well known and responsible for our 
exceptional epistemic progress across the ages (Laland, 2017).
The last but not the least network is called “extended” 
and consists of distant kin, professional acquaintances, and 
“friends of friends” (Massey, 2005), in the number between 
100 and 400 persons. Relations between them are “weak 
ties”, crucial – as Mark Granovetter (1974) showed – not only 
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for our professional success, but – thanks to Matthew Lieb-
erman’s neurocognitive work – indispensible for building 
conceptual selves among teenagers (13-18 years of age). 
Their brains, in the area of the default mode network, cre-
ate the sense of self mostly on the basis of other people’s 
opinions about their owners. In consequence, Lieberman 
offers a Trojan horse self hypothesis, according to which 
“the self may be evolution’s sneakiest ploy to ensure the suc-
cess of group living. (…) the self is, at least in part, a clev-
erly disguised deception that allows the social world in and 
allows us to be ‘overtaken’ by the social world without our 
even noticing” (Lieberman, 2013, pp. 189-190).
The mental states created by the default mode network 
are conscious concepts referring to axiological content of the 
moral neural sense (our conscience) located probably in the 
lateral frontal pole (Neubert et al., 2014). It means the objects 
of consciousness aren’t the states of the physical world, 
nor affordances of the cognitive niche, but mostly values 
of our moral minds. Jonathan Haidt (2012) claims there are 
six of them, responsible for our decisions questioning the eco-
nomical analysis of costs and benefits (Ariely, 2013), and cru-
cial in the process of self formation (Błaszak, 2013). The third 
cognitive dimension of the public space can be called “ratio-
nal”, supplementing our perception of other people as biolog-
ical organisms (sensations), cognitive tools (perceptions) with 
concepts letting us see them as axiological subjects.
The study of public spaces considered as complex adaptive 
systems cautions scientists against naively breaking the sys-
tem into independently acting individual agents. The postu-
late of a “cognitive dimensions of public space” points to the 
idea that the content of mental states isn’t fully defined by 
activity of the human brain. The valuable information imple-
mented in cultural artifacts and in minds of other people is 
equally important. It seems then that the brain isn’t the only 
level of causation in psychology, and the science of human 
beings shouldn’t be neuro-centered the way Francis Crick 
saw it in his “The Astonishing Hypothesis”: “’You’, your joys 
and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your 
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more 
than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
associated molecules” (Crick, 1995, p. 3).
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Fig. 4 Three cognitive dimensions of public space
Public space
Size Intimate  
networks
Effective  
networks
Extended  
networks
Behavior Experiential Functional Rational
Mind Sensations (p(i))
The sentient self 
(“I feel therefore 
I am”)
Perceptions 
(p(i|h))
The epistemic  
self  
(“I think there-
fore I am”)
Concepts (p(h))
The reflective 
self  
(“I imagine 
therefore I am”)
Brain The salience 
network
The central 
executive net-
work
The default 
mode network
References
Ariely, D. (2013). The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty. London: 
Harper Collins.
Bennett, Ch. (1990). How to define complexity in physics, and 
why. In: W. Zurek (Ed.), Complexity, Entropy and the Phys-
ics of Information. SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, 
VIII. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Błaszak, M. (2013). Ekotypy poznawcze człowieka [Cognitive 
ecotypes of human beings]. Poznań: Bogucki Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe.
Bressler, S. L., Menon, V. (2010). Large-scale brain networks 
in cognition: emerging methods and principles. Trends in cog-
nitive sciences, 14(6), 277-290.
Clark, A. (2016). Surfing Uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press
Corballis, M. (2015). The Wandering Mind. What the Brain Does 
When You’re Not Looking. Chicago: The University of Chica-
go Press.
Craig A. D. (2015). How do you feel? An Interoceptive moment 
with your neurobiological self. New Jersey: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Crawford, M. (2015). The World Beyond Your Head. How to Flour-
ish in an Age of Distraction. London: Viking.
Crick, F. (1995). The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search 
for the Soul. New York: Touchstone.
Dennett, D. (2017). From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The Evolu-
tion of Minds. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
168 | Maciej Błaszak |
Flynn, J. (2016). Does Your Family Make You Smarter? Nature, 
Nurture and Human Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Frisby, J., Stone, J. V. (2010). Seeing. The Computational 
Approach to Biological Vision. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Gazzaley, A., Rosen, L. (2016). The Distracted Mind. Ancient 
Brains in a High-Tech World. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gluckman, P., Hanson, M. (2006). Mismatch. The Lifestyle Diseas-
es Timebomb. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, E. (2010). The New Executive Brain. Frontal Lobes 
in a Complex World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Granovetter, M. (1974). Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and 
Careers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gregory, R. (2009). Seeing Through Illusions. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind. London: Allen Lane.
Hallowell, E. (2005). Overloaded Circuits: Why Smart People 
Underperform, „Harvard Business Review”, January.
Hohwy, J. (2013). The Predictive Mind. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Hurley, S. (2001). Perception and action: Alternative views. Syn-
these, 129(1), 3-40.
Koutstaal, W., Binks, J. (2015). Innovating Minds. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Laland, K. (2017). Darwin’s Unfinished Symphony. How Cul-
ture Made the Human Mind. New Jersey: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Levitin, D. (2015). The Organized Mind: Thinking Straight in the 
Age of Information Overload. London: Penguin.
Libet, B. (2005). Mind Time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Lieberman, M. (2013). Social. Why Our Brains Are Wired to Con-
nect. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lotto, B. (2017). Deviate. The Science of Seeing Differently. Lon-
don: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. New York: W. H. Freeman. 
Massey, D. (2005). Strangers in a Strange Land. New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co.
Milardo, R. M. (1992). Comparative methods for delineating social 
networks. Journal of social and personal relationships, 9(3), 
447-461.
Miller, J., Page, S. (2007). Complex Adaptive Systems. An Intro-
duction to Computational Models of Social Life. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.
| 169| Cognitive dimensions of public space
Neubert, F. X., Mars, R. B., Thomas, A. G., Sallet, J., Rushworth, 
M. F. (2014). Comparison of human ventral frontal cortex areas 
for cognitive control and language with areas in monkey fron-
tal cortex. Neuron, 81(3), 700-713.
Norretranders, T. (1998). The User Illusion. New York: Viking.
Raichle, M. E., Snyder, A. Z. (2007). A default mode of brain func-
tion: a brief history of an evolving idea. Neuroimage, 37(4), 
1083-1090.
Rasmussen, S. E. (1962). Experiencing Architecture. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press.
Ross, L., Greene, D., House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: 
An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution process-
es. Journal of experimental social psychology, 13(3), 279-301.
Stone, J. V. (2012). Vision and Brain. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press.
Uddin, L. (2017). Salience Network of the Human Brain. London: 
Academic Press.
West, G. (2017). Scale. The Universal Laws of Life and Death 
in Organisms, Cities and Companies. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson.

